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Abstract
We study whether cross- and within-culture groups have different cooperation
rates in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. In an experiment, university students in China
and America engage in a single iteration of the game, complete belief elicitation tasks
regarding their opponents’ play and take a survey including attitudinal measurements
regarding their in- and out-group attitudes. Cooperation rates are higher across the two
countries are higher in both cross-culture and in within-culture interactions, although
not significantly. We also find that Chinese participants cooperate less than American
ones. Further, female Chinese participants are more cooperative than Chinese male ones.
In the cross-culture treatment, Chinese participants underestimate the likelihood of
cooperative behavior of their American counterparts, while Americans overestimate the
same likelihood of their Chinese counterparts. Our results also show that Chinese
participants cooperate more conditionally than American ones. Finally, while we find
some attitudinal in- and out-biases both they do not generate meaningful impact on
cooperative behavior.
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1. Introduction
The dramatic rise of global connectivity has spurred investigations of crosscultural differences in behavioral norms. We believe this is a particularly important area
of investigation in the case of the United States (US) and China. As the two largest
economies in the world, the combined GDP of the United States and China exceeds 37%
of the world's GDP according to the International Monetary Fund in 2020. Bilateral
trade between the two countries accounts for more than 10% of total international trade.
Moreover bilateral cooperation between the US and China, whether at the government
or individual level, affects the development prospects of the world economy. However,
the US and China have distinct cultures and may bring different norms and beliefs to
bilateral cooperation. These differences could affect the success of cooperative efforts,
at both the individual and more aggregated levels, between the two countries.
In an experimental study of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Hemesath and
Pomponio (1998) found that (1) Chinese students cooperated significantly more often
than American students participating in a study abroad program did and (2) both groups
cooperated less often when paired with a foreign partner. We revisit the premise of their
study for several reasons. First, the relationship between the US and China evolved over
the past two decades, and has reached a more tumultuous point. Second, we adopt
recruitment procedures that do not suffer from the selection bias of study abroad
students. Third, we use an experimental design that increases the power of the study
through larger sample size and the use of a single play of the game. Fourth, we also
elicit subjects’ beliefs about their opponents’ behavior and subjects’ attitudes toward inand out-national groups. Finally, we provide an examination of the cooperative
tendencies of genders in the respective cultures.
There is an extensive experimental literature investigating differences in
cooperation for within-cultural strategic interactions. Henrich et al. (2005) conducts a
broad study across fifteen different societies and finds the level of prosociality
expressed in experimental games is positively correlated with the degree of market
integration and the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life. Gächter et al. (2010)
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research cooperation differences across fifteen countries with six different cultures and
find that cultural differences in cooperation exist in the sense that within-cultural
variation is smaller than the between-cultural variation. Goerg and Walkowitz (2010)
run cooperation game experiments in four different countries. They find cooperation
levels differ significantly across subject pools. In the negative externalities treatment,
where a transfer creates a negative externality for the opposite player, Chengdu (China)
subjects have a significantly lower cooperation rate than Helsinki (Finland) and
Jerusalem. Frey (2019) investigates ten countries and shows that there are small
differences in cooperation rates between countries, ranging from 8.5% (Argentina) to
14.1% (Greece). Cassar et al. (2014) study two nations, Italy and Kosovo, and conclude
that moral norms of cooperative behavior can follow improvements in formal
institutional quality. These studies for the most part investigate the impact of culture by
directly comparing the experimental results in different cultures but not cross-cultural
interactions.
The literature on cross-cultural experimentation, in which subjects interact with
people in a cross-culture/cross-national group, is limited. Chuah et al. (2007, 2009)
conduct experiments with cross-national ultimatum bargaining between Malaysian and
UK subjects, and find Malaysian proposers make higher offers to Malaysian than to UK
responders. Matsumoto and Hwang (2011, 2015) run experiments between US-bornand-raised Americans and international students. They find larger culture differences
and related higher contempt emotion are associated with less cooperative and more
competitive behavior. Goerg et al. (2013) investigate cooperation in a continuous
prisoner's dilemma game of Israelis and Palestinians within a controlled laboratory
experiment. Cooperation decreases for pairs of cross-group subjects.
There is a vast experimental economics literature providing mixed evidence
assessing the impact of gender on cooperation. Some find women cooperate
significantly more than men (Gilligan, 1982), especially when they are observed by
their peer group (Charness and Rustichini, 2011). Furthermore, Andreas et al. (1999)
discover that women display cooperative behavior substantially more than men in the
3

first several rounds of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, but this difference disappears by
the last round. They also report that female and male cooperation rates become more
similar in single-sex environments. However, Rapoport and Chammah (1965) find, also
in Prisoner’s Dilemma Games, that in single-sex environments, substantially more men
than women choose to cooperate
Our experimental study complements and fills some of the gaps in these literatures.
First, we conduct our study with both cross- or within-national interactions in the
country where the subjects grew up. Second, instead of recruiting subjects from two
cultures in the same area, we guarantee that our subjects participate in the experiment
in their home country by performing the experiment online to avoid the possible effect
of the living environment on their strategies. 1 Moreover, our subjects start to play the
game simultaneously. Third, we extend the exploration of the difference in conditional
cooperation in different cultures, through task eliciting beliefs of their counterpart’s
strategy and surveying attitudes of both within and outgroup nations. Finally, we
conduct our experiments in one-shot with anonymity, they were only told about the
nationality of their counterpart, avoiding reputational or strategic considerations
coming from non-anonymous (Milinski et al., 2002; Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006)
and repeated play.
Our four major results are as follows. First, American participants exhibit higher
proportions of cooperative behavior than Chinese ones. Each nationality exhibits
nominal, but not statistically, higher rates of cooperation for cross-cultural rather than
within-cultural interactions. Second, females exhibit higher rates of cooperation. This
is particularly significant in regression results in which we control for other potential
factors. Third, conditional cooperation is a significant factor affecting cooperation. This
impact of this affect is almost twice as strong for Chinese participants as it is for
American ones. Fourth, despite revealing potential in- and out-group attitudinal

We loosely use the terms Chinese and American for those studying fulltime at Wuhan and Chapman
Universities respectively. Chinese participants are exclusively Chinese nationals, while we cannot
identify the nationalities of the American participants. However, eleven of those participants selfidentified as ethnically Chinese. In unreported results, we verify all of our results are robust to removing
the data for these eleven participants.
1
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differences in survey responses it generates little impact. We only find a marginally
significant effect for Chinese participants in the out-group setting in which a more
favorable view of China diminishes the tendency to cooperate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The design of our study is
depicted in Section 2. We report the experimental results in Section 3. Finally, we
present further discussions in Section 4.

2. Experimental Design
Our experiment consists of a single play of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, with the
payoffs for the two players described in Table 1, followed by an elicitation task for a
subject’s beliefs regarding their counterpart’s likelihood of choosing to cooperate
(Option A) and a short survey including questions regarding their attitude towards the
two countries.
Table 1: Prisoner's Dilemma Game Payoff Matrix
Other Player

You

A

B

A

8 E, 8 E

2 E, 12 E

B

12 E, 2 E

4 E, 4 E

1 E-Dollar = USD $1.00, 1 E-Dollar = RMB ¥ 1.60

Each subject makes a single choice of either option A (cooperate) or B (defect) in
the first stage of the experiment. We do not inform the subjects of the results of the
game until all data from their session are collected, including the elicitation tasks and
survey, and processed with a random match with a counterpart for payment.
After the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, subjects complete a pair of belief elicitation
tasks. First, we ask them to predict whether their counterpart selected option A, while
informing them a correct prediction will receive a twenty experimental cents reward.
Second, we ask them to guess what percentage of the players from their counterpart’s
country chose option A, while informing them a guess within ten percent of the true
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proportion will receive a twenty experimental cents reward. 2
In the post-experiment survey, we ask subjects about their general attitudes towards
China and the United States, their impressions of Chinese and Americans, their
attention to the nationality of their partners, and other personal characteristics. We
collect the attitudinal measurements towards the two countries to assess whether there
are in-group or outgroup biases and if these generate differences in cooperative behavior.

2.1 Treatments
Our first primary treatments are cross-cultural interaction, which generates two subtreatments: where Chinese students play against American students (CA) and American
students play against Chinese students (AC). The second primary treatment is withinculture interaction, which generates two more sub-treatments: Chinese students play
against Chinese students (CC) and American students play against American students
(AA). 3 In each treatment, we inform subjects at the beginning of the session whether
their counterpart is from their own or the other country.

2.2 Subjects
We recruited 322 individuals: 162 subjects from the United States and 160 from
China. American subjects were students from Chapman University recruited through
ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), and Chinese subjects were recruited from Wuhan University
through ancademy.org. To account for the odd subject number in the CC treatment and
the different sum of participants for the CA and AC treatments, which prevents one-toone matching, we randomly chose a matched subject for the unmatched subject to give
the subject feedback and count their payment.
Table 2 reports by treatment some descriptive statistics of the subjects’
demographics and survey responses. We note there are fewer male subjects than female

We implement belief elicitation tasks with financial incentives to make their choice in the task payoff
salient. However, due to concerns over potential attempts to use the task to hedge the risk in total payoffs
for the experiment we make the task payoffs small relative to game payoffs and we do not inform subjects
there is the elicitation task until after making their game choices.
3
Abbreviation derived from country names’ initial letters.
2
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subjects, particularly so for the American sample. The average age is about 20 years,
with a slightly higher average for the American sample. The subjects majoring in
economics account for a certain proportion, but are not the majority.
Turning to attitudinal measurements, subjects prefer their own country to the other
country (p-value < 0.001, all tests reported within text are Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
Further, in the cross-culture treatment, the concern of the partner’s nationality is higher
than that in the within-culture treatment (p-value = 0.001). We ask the subjects “how
much did you pay attention to your partner’s nationality?” Participants can respond with
a value of 1 to 3 corresponding respectively to “paid no attention”, “paid little attention”,
and “paid much attention.” In both the Chinese and American samples, subjects in
cross-culture treatments are significantly more concerned about their partner’s
nationality than subjects are in the within-culture treatments (p-value = 0.008 and pvalue = 0.001).
Table 2: Descriptions of subjects by treatments
CC

CA

AA

AC

Male

42.4%

37.3%

28.6%

26.9%

Age

19.98

19.65

20.27

20.45

Attitude towards China (1-5)

4.87

4.87

2.82

2.94

Attitude towards the US (1-5)

2.89

3.20

3.42

3.36

Attention paid to the
Partner’s Nationality (1-3)

1.28

1.71

1.24

1.54

27.1%

24.0%

10.7%

7.7%

85

75

84

78

Economics major
Observations

Attitude towards China/the US is a rating question from Unfavorable to Favorable.

2.3 Procedures
We conducted three experimental sessions in December 2020. We constructed an
online survey to elicit all responses using the website www.wjx.cn. We produced a
version of the survey in English for the Chapman University participants and in
Mandarin for the Wuhan University participants. We provide the English version of the
7

instructions in the appendix, and the Mandarin version is available upon request from
the corresponding author. In each session, the experiment commenced simultaneously
in China and the US via controlled release of the survey.
Subjects are paid 24 hours after the experiment’s conclusion to avoid unnecessary
variation caused by non-identical instructions and given the time zone difference. Those
who completed the experiment are paid in their respective currency based on their
performance throughout the experiment. Due to the nature of purchasing power parity
between China and the US, we weighted the conversion rate of the experimental dollars.
Chinese and American subjects earned ¥22.23 and $13.52 on average, respectively,
including 7 experimental dollars as a show-up fee, namely, ¥11.2 for Chinese subjects
and $7 for American subjects. Each session took approximately half an hour or less in
total.

3. Experimental Results
3.1 Cross-cultural cooperation rates
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, as well
as Chi-squared hypothesis test resulting comparing cooperation averages. The
cooperation rate for American subjects is 58.6 percent (162 subjects) versus is 43.75
percent (160 subjects) for Chinese subjects, which is significantly less than that for
American subjects (p-value = 0.01). We also observe more cooperative behavior from
American than Chinese participants in both the within- and cross-culture treatments (pvalue = 0.05 and = 0.13, respectively). One of our main questions is whether people
exhibit different rates of cooperative behavior in within- and cross-culture in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Although the cooperation rates are larger in cross-culture
treatments than in within-culture treatments, we find no statistically significant
difference for either the Chinese (p-value = 0.59) or American group (p-value = 0.81).
Result 1: (Group cooperation rates) American participants exhibit greater
proportions of cooperative behavior in both within- and cross-cultural interactions.
Each nationality exhibits nominal, but not statistically, higher rates of cooperation in
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cross- versus within-cultural interactions.
Table 3: Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Chinese American CC

CA

AA

AC

Cooperation Rate (%)

43.8

58.6

41.2

46.7

57.1

60.3

Sample Size

160

162

85

75

84

78

Chinese versus American p-value = 0.01
CC versus CA

p-value = 0.59

AA versus AC

p-value = 0.81

CC versus AA

p-value = 0.05

CA versus AC

p-value = 0.13

CC means “Chinese students in the within-culture treatment”, CA means “Chinese students in the
cross-culture treatment”, AA means “American students in the within-culture treatment”, AC means
“American students in the cross-culture treatment”. All mean comparisons are performed via a Chisquared test.

In Table 4, we disaggregate the data in Table 3 by gender. In all treatments, the
cooperation rates of female subjects exceed those of male ones. Even with a reduced
numbers of observations, resulting in lower power for the Chi-square tests, we still find
a highly significant difference for the Chinese females versus Chinese males in the
cross-culture treatments, and marginally significant differences for Chinese and
American females in the within-cultural treatments. These marginal results become
highly significant in the regression results of Table 7. The conclusion that female
subjects are significantly more likely to cooperate than male subjects supports the
findings of Andreas et al. (1999).
Result 2: (Gender cooperation rates) Females exhibit greater cooperative behavior
in both within and cross-cultural interactions.
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Table 4: Cooperation by Gender in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
CCF

CCM

CAF

CAM AAF

AAM ACF

ACM

Cooperation Rate (%)

49.0

30.6

57.5

28.6

63.3

41.7

64.9

47.6

Sample Size

49

36

47

28

60

24

57

21

CCF versus CCM

p-value = 0.14

CAF versus CAM

p-value = 0.03

AAF versus AAM

p-value = 0.12

ACF versus ACM

p-value = 0.26

CCF means “female in CC”, CCM means “male in CC”, CAF means “female in CA”, CAM means
“male in CA”. AAF means “female in AA”, AAM means “male in AA”, ACF means “female in
AC”, ACM means “male in AC”. All mean comparisons are performed using a Chi-squared test.

3.2 Some determinants of cooperation
In the following analysis, we examine the affect one’s expectation of their
counterpart’s play and one’s in- and out-group attitudes have on their cooperative
behavior. We first report group differences on the expectation of their counterpart’s
cooperation conditional upon their counterpart’s country. Then we report group
differences with respect to in- and out-group attitudes. We then present regression
analyses on how these factors effect individuals’ cooperative behavior.
Conditional cooperation has long been an identified decision rule in dilemmas such
as Public Good games (Fischbacher et al., 2001) and later in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game (List, 2006). A player is a conditional cooperator in our single play setting is
more likely to cooperate the stronger their belief that their counterpart is going to
cooperate. We use the response to the question “guess what percentage of the players
from China/US chose option A in today's experiment” as our measurement of that belief.
As shown in Table 5, Chinese subjects have lower expectations of cooperation rate from
their counterpart than American ones (p-value = 0.07), especially in the cross-culture
treatment (p-value = 0.04).
We also find it interesting to note the accuracy and biases found in the beliefs by
player and interaction type. In the cross-culture treatment, Chinese subjects
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underestimate the cooperation rate of their American counterpart (expected 51.53%,
actually 60.26%, p-value = 0.002), and Americans overestimate the cooperation rate of
their Chinese counterpart (expected 59.78%, actually 46.67%, p-value = 0.006). The
similar pattern of inaccuracy does not occur in the within-culture treatment. Chinese
subjects overestimate their Chinese counterpart’s cooperation rate (expected 55.18%,
actually 41.18%, p-value = 0.015); American subjects correctly estimate their American
counterpart’s cooperation rate (expected 58.05%, actually 57.14%, p-value = 0.254).
Table 5: Cooperation Expectation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
CC

CA

AA

AC

Expected Cooperation (%)

55.2

51.5

58.0

59.8

Standard Deviation

25.90

24.84

20.47

21.46

Sample Size

85

75

84

78

Chinese versus American

p-value = 0.07

CC versus CA

p-value = 0.42

AA versus AC

p-value = 0.43

CC versus AA

p-value = 0.58

CA versus AC

p-value = 0.04

All mean comparisons are performed using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test.

In- and out-group biases reflect differential attitudes one has towards those who
they consider as part of their identity group versus those who are

not considered part

of their identity group. Behavioral economists, for example (Chen and Li, 2009), argue
group biases moderate the tendency to cooperate through individuals’ social
preferences – in affect transforming the payoffs of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. We
use the responses to the attitudinal questions, “What are your views on the China/United
States? On a scale of 1 to 5. please indicate your level of feelings. 1 = Unfavorable, 2
= a little Unfavorable, 3 = Neutral, 4 = a little favorable, 5 = Favorable,” as proxy
measurements for in- and out-group bias.
With respect to the view on one’s country of residence, in-group preference,
Chinese have a higher view than Americans, but there is no difference between cross11

culture and within-culture treatments, as shown in Table 6. On the other hand, views of
the other country differ. When subjects participate in a cross-culture interaction, their
view to their counterpart’s country becomes much higher. Particularly striking, Chinese
subjects’ view of the US (3.200) in the cross-culture setting is almost as high as their
American partner’s view of the US (3.359) in a cross-culture game. This suggests the
frame of our experimental task is priming a more positive attitude towards the other
country in the cross-cultural treatments. We will explore how these attitudes affects
their propensity for cooperative behavior.
Table 6: Summary of responses to attitude towards countries
Cross-culture treatment

Mean

SD

Within-culture treatment

Mean

SD

p-value

CA, View of China (n=75)

4.87

0.41

CC, View of China (n=85)

4.87

0.43

0.816

CA, View of US (n=75)

3.20

0.79

CC, View of US (n=85)

2.89

0.91

0.018

AC, View of China (n=78)

2.94

0.93

AA, View of China (n=84)

2.82

0.92

0.479

AC, View of US (n=78)

3.36

1.08

AA, View of US (n=84)

3.42

1.16

0.729

Chinese

American

All mean comparisons are performed using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test.

We now assess the impact conditional cooperation and group biases have on
cooperative behavior through multivariate logistic regressions. Table 7 reports
estimated coefficients and the marginal effects for the Chinese, American and pooled
samples. First, we strong evidence of conditional cooperation in both nation groups.
The first set of evidence are the highly significant estimated coefficients and marginal
effects for the Expect cooperation (elicited belief) for the two groups. Further, this effect
size is almost twice as large for the Chinese subjects. Namely, a one-percent increase
in one’s expected cooperation results in an estimated 1.3% and 0.7% increase in
cooperation for Chinese and American subjects respectively. This is confirmed by the
marginally significant estimated coefficient and marginal effect size for the interaction
variable Expect cooperation*Chinese in the pooled sample.
Result 3: (Conditional cooperation) Conditional cooperation is a strong factor in
12

determining the choice to cooperate. This influence is almost twice as strong for the
Chinese compared to the Americans.
Next, we consider the impact of group attitude on the tendency to cooperate. First,
we find no evidence of such influence in the within-group treatments as indicated by
the insignificant coefficient estimates for the variables View of China and View of US.
(The baseline setting for these estimates is the within-culture treatment). For the crosscultural treatment impacts of group bias, captured by the interaction terms of crossculture and view, we find no significant estimates with one exception. In the crossculture setting, the Chinese have a marginally significant coefficient on their View of
China variable. This indicates some potential in-group bias, but we do not want to
overemphasize this as the Chinese almost exclusively give a rating of four or five in
this treatment.
Result 4: (In- and out-group preferences) There is no impact of either in- or outgroup biases (as measured by our attitudinal survey question) on the propensity to
cooperate with one exception. There is weak evidence in-group bias diminishes
cooperation for Chinese subjects in cross-cultural interaction.
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Table 7: Logit regressions for the determinants of cooperation
Dependent variable: Choice to cooperate (option A)
Chinese

Americans

Pooled

Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal
effect
effect
effect
Chinese

Cross-culture

Expect ratio

-1.123

-0.274

(0.869)

(0.202)

7.252**

0.947****

0.330

0.079

0.933

0.229

(3.588)

(0.135)

(1.526)

(0.361)

(1.260)

(0.294)

0.053***

0.013***

0.029***

0.007***

0.030***

0.007***

(0.010)

(0.002)

(0.009)

(0.002)

(0.010)

(0.002)

-1.071** -0.244*** -1.024*** -0.249*** -0.994***

Male

-0.242***

(0.417)

(0.089)

(0.343)

(0.095)

(0.274)

(0.065)

0.343

0.082

-0.346

-0.083

-0.275

-0.069

(0.436)

(0.190)

(0.255)

(0.065)

(0.180)

(0.050)

0.321

0.077

-0.023

-0.005

0.095

0.024

(0.375)

(0.080)

(0.205)

(0.051)

(0.176)

(0.044)

Cross-culture* View of China -1.138*

-0.272

0.266

0.064

0.101

0.025

(0.651)

(0.244)

(0.364)

(0.093)

(0.187)

(0.053)

-0.427

-0.102

-0.294

-0.071

-0.323

-0.081

(0.556)

(0.120)

(0.350)

(0.079)

(0.297)

(0.066)

0.023*

0.006*

(0.013)

(0.003)

View of China

View of US

Cross-culture* View of US

Expect ratio*Chinese

Control variables

Economic major, Age

Constant

-4.215

-0.609

-0.354

(3.045)

(1.795)

(1.264)

160

162

322

Observations
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
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4. Discussion
Technological advances, globalization and increasing worldwide prosperity all
contribute to growing incidences of cross-cultural interactions and further joint
participation in projects. Success of multi-person efforts often relies upon the ability of
individuals to engaging cooperatively without formal institutional enforcements. With
China’s unique culture and recent ascension to one of the largest economies and the
United States long-standing hegemony, there will be an ever-growing incidence of such
multi-person efforts between individuals from these two cultures.
Financially incentivized Prisoner’s Dilemma Game experiments are simple and
effective instruments to measure this cooperation and to study what factors influence
cooperation. Our results suggest some important policy initiatives and nudges that
could increase cooperation rates. One, our results surprisingly suggest increasing
female participation can lead to increased joint cooperation, although Chinese female
and American female joint play remains an evaluation to be made. Two, one can address
the Chinese underestimation of the propensity of Americans to cooperate through
presentation of accurate rates of cooperation. Three, the high incidence of conditional
cooperation suggests cooperation begets cooperation. This suggests actions like preplay interactions or scaling up the decision sizes could be effective and only moderately
bureaucratic interventions. Finally, the large attention paid to attitudinal impact of
group identity is perhaps overemphasized; it surprisingly has questionable impact on
behavioral outcomes.
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Appendix A: Experimental Instructions
Example for AC treatment.
Welcome to today's experiment. You are about to participate in an experiment on
decision-making. During this experiment, we ask you and the other participants to make
decisions and to fill out a questionnaire. Your decisions in the experiment and the data
from the questionnaire will be used for scientific purposes only.
Participants in this experiment are from 2 universities in different countries:
Students of the University of Chapman in the United States and Wuhan University
in China will play the experiment on the same day over the internet. Those who
are in China will see these instructions in Mandarin. Those who are in America
will see these instructions in English. And no participants at any university will see
any decisions by the other participants. As an American participant, you will be
paired up with an anonymous and random participant from the Chinese university.
The experiment consists of one task and a questionnaire. You will receive the earnings
from the task of the experiment. You are required to finish the experiment in one hour.
If it is not completed in one hour then no money is paid.
During the experiment, we will speak in terms of experimental tokens (€) instead of
dollars. Your payoffs will be calculated in terms of tokens and then translated into
dollars at the end of the experiment at the following rate:
1 experiment token (€) = 1.0 US Dollar
For your participation, we will pay you with 7 experimental tokens as a show-up fee.
You will be awarded additional experimental tokens based on your performance in this
experiment. As you and your partner are in different time zones, we will give you the
results of both of your choices following your partner's completion of this experiment
tomorrow morning.
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Task
In this task, you will be anonymously paired with a player from Wuhan University
(China). During and after the game you will not be told with the player you have
been paired and the other player will not be told that he or she has been matched
with you.
In this task, both you and your partner have two choices in this game: A or B. For this
game, your payoff will depend on your choice as well as your partner’s choice. Both
you and your partner will make your choice on the same day, meaning neither of you
will find out what the choice of the other has made, and the game will not be repeated.
The payoff matrix corresponding to your decision and that of the other participant is as
follows. In each cell, the first number (in bold) is your payoff, and the second number
is the payoff of the other participant. That is,
If you both choose to A, you will earn €8, and your partner will earn €8.
If you choose to A, and your partner chooses to B, you will earn €2, and your partner
will earn €12.
If you choose B, and your partner chooses A, you will earn €12, and your partner will
earn €2.
If you both choose B, you will earn €4, and your partner will earn €4.
The other player from Wuhan University (China)

You

A

B

A

8 E, 8 E

2 E, 12 E

B

12 E, 2 E

4 E, 4 E

In this task, according to the payoff matrix, what's your choice?
(a) A
(b) B
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Appendix B: Post-experiment Questionnaire
Example for AC.

Page 1
Recall that, the payoff matrix in the task is:
The other player from Wuhan University (China)

You

A

B

A

8 E, 8 E

2 E, 12 E

B

12 E, 2 E

4 E, 4 E

Please answer the following questions.
1. In the last task, what do you expect your partner has chosen? You will receive €0.20
for a correct result.
(a) A
(b) B
2. In the last task, guess what percentage of the players from China chose option A in
today's experiment. If your guess comes as close as 10% to the actual ratio, you
receive an additional €0.20.
The unites are %. Please enter an integer number (from 0 to 100). If you guess the
percentage is XX%, just enter XX.
_________________________________

Page 2
Now, please answer the following questions.
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1. What are your views on the People's Republic of China? On a scale of 1 to 5, please
indicate your level of feelings.
1 = Unfavorable, 2 = a little Unfavorable, 3 = Neutral, 4 = a little favorable, 5 =
Favorable:
(a) Unfavorable
(b) A little unfavorable
(c) Neutral
(d) A little favorable
(e) Favorable
2. What are your views on the United States of America? On a scale of 1 to 5, please
indicate your level of feelings.
1 = Unfavorable, 2 = a little Unfavorable, 3 = Neutral, 4 = a little favorable, 5 =
Favorable:
(a) Unfavorable
(b) A little unfavorable
(c) Neutral
(d) A little favorable
(e) Favorable

Page 3
Please answer the following questions about yourself.
1. What is your age?
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_________________________________
2. What is your gender?
(a) Male
(b) Female
3. Which category of the following includes your major, please?
(a) Philosophy
(b) Economics
(c) Law
(d) Pedagogy
(e) Literature
(f) History
(g) Natural Science
(h) Engineering
(i) Agronomy
(j) Medicine
(k) Management
(l) Art
(m) Other (please specify) _________________
4. Please tell us your ethnicity?
(a) African
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(b) Asian
(c) European
(d) Hispanic
(e) Native
(f) Other (please specify) _________________
5. Have you ever been to China? *
(a) Yes
(a) No

Page 4
The following questions concern your family.
1. How many generations has your family lived here?
(a) First Generation
(b) Second Generation
(c) More than two Generations
2. From which countries did your family originate?
(a) United States
(b) China
(c) African
(d) Asian
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(e) European
(f) Americas
(g) Other (please specify) _________________
3. Thinking about your family income, compared with other American families in
general, would you say your family income was roughly:
(a) Below average
(b) Average
(c) Above average

Page 5
There are 12 items below. Please read each item and determine the extent to which you
agree or disagree. Please select the option that fits your true opinion.
1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = In general, 4 = agree, 5 = Strongly agree
For each item, please select the opinion fits your true opinion by choosing the
appropriate number form number 1-5.
1. I think that Chinese people are strategic is a common stereotype in my society.
2. I think that Chinese people are trustworthy is a common stereotype in my society.
3. I think that Chinese people are naive is a common stereotype in my society.
4. I think that Chinese people are sneaky is a common stereotype in my society.
5. I think that Chinese people are cooperative is a common stereotype in my society.
6. I think that Chinese people are competitive is a common stereotype in my society.
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7. I think that American people are strategic is a common stereotype in my society.
8. I think that American people are trustworthy is a common stereotype in my society.
9. I think that American people are naive is a common stereotype in my society.
10. I think that American people are sneaky is a common stereotype in my society.
11. I think that American people are cooperative is a common stereotype in my society.
12. I think that American people are competitive is a common stereotype in my society.

Page 6
Please answer the following questions.
1. Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you can’t be
too careful in dealing with people?
(a) Always trusted
(b) Usually trusted
(c) Neutral
(d) Usually not trusted
(e) Always not trusted
2. How trusting are you?
(a) Always trusting
(b) Usually trusting
(c) Neutral
(d) Usually not trusting
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(e) Always not trusting
3. During the Experiment you tried to:
(a) Maximize my own payoffs
(b) Maximize joint payoffs
(c) Maximize player B’s payoffs
4. During the experiment, how much did you pay attention to your partner’s
nationality?
(a) Paid a lot of attention
(b) Paid little attention
(c) Paid no attention

Thank you!
You have finished today's experiment! As you and your partner are in different time
zones, you will receive your payment 24 hours after the experiment, the amount of your
payment is derived from both you and your partner's choice.
Please enter your school email, so that we can pay you the payment!
_________________________________
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